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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the district court's order denying Two Jim, IIIC.'s ("Two Jinn") 
motion to set aside forfeiture and exonerate bond and its order denying Two Jinn's motion to 
reconsider the denial of that motion. 
B. General Course of Proceedings 
Roderick Brown was charged with burglary and driving without privileges and the district 
couit set his bail at $5000. R. 19-21, 31. On January 16, 2008, Two Jinn - doing business as 
AladdinIAnytime Bail Bonds -posted a bond on Mr. Brown's behalf. R. 36-38. On February 
12,2008, Mr. Brown appeared in the district court and his trial was continued at the state's 
request. R. 5 1-52. Mr. Brown also appeared in court on February 28,2008, April 10,2008, and 
April 15,2008. R. 57-58,6346. On June 12, 2008, Mr. Brown failed to appear for court and the 
district court forfeited the bond posted by Two Ji~m. R. 69-71. 
On October 23,2008, Mr. Brown appeared in coult. R. 72-73. On October 28,2008, 
Two Jinn filed a Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and Exonerate Bond. R. 74. Two Jinn argued 
that the Idaho Criminal Rules provide for automatic exoneration when a defendant appears or is 
brought before the court within 180 days after the bond is forfeited and, because Mr. Brown 
appeared in court within that time frame, it was entitled to exoneration. R. 75. Mr. Brown also 
appeared in court on October 30,2008, November 20,2008, and December 8,2008, all of which 
were within 180 days followil~g the district court's order forfeiting the bond. R. 79, 84, 87. 
Following a hearing, the district court denied Two Ji~m's motion on the basis that Idaho Criminal 
Rule ("ICR") 46(g), like LC. 5 19-2927,' requires a defendant to satisfactorily excuse his failure 
to appear before the hond can he exonerated. R. 98. In the alternative, the district court 
concluded that if ICR 46(g) did not require the defendant to excuse his failure to appear and was 
thus in conflict with I.C. 5 19-2927, the statute controls because it sets forth a matter of 
substance, rather than procedure. R. 98-99. Two Jinn filed a motion for reconsideration, which 
the district court also denied. R. 104-1 14, 128. Mr. Brown was ultimately sentenced to a tenn of 
incarceration. R. 136-37. This appeal follows. 
111. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the district court err in concluding that ICR 46(g) did not require exoneration 
of the hond? 
B. Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Two Jinn's motion for 
reconsideration because ICR 46(g) required exoneration of the bond? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Idaho Criminal Rule 46(g) Requires Exoneration of the Bond. 
Forfeiture, relief from forfeiture, and exoneration of hail are governed by statute and court 
rule, Idaho Criminal Rule 46. State v. Quick Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho 651, 653, 167 P.3d 
788, 790 (Ct. App. 2007). The district court's conclusion that Rule 46(g) required the defendant 
to satisfactorily excuse his failure to appear decided a matter of law, which is reviewed by this 
Court de novo. See State v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520,523, 198 P.3d 749,752 (Ct. App. 2008) 
I As discussed in greater detail herein, on April 1,2009, the legislature repealed previous 
bail statutes, illcluding LC. 5 19-2927, and enacted the Idaho Bail Act ("the Bail Act"), which 
became effective July 1,2009. See 2009 Idaho Laws Ch. 90 (H.B. 184). Similarly, on June 15, 
2009, the Idaho Supreme Court repealed ICR 46 in its entirety and adopted a new ICR 46, which 
also became effective July 1, 2009. 
(questions of law reviewed de 11ovo). 
The primary purpose of bail is not punitive but, rather, to ensure the presence of the 
accused. Quick Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho at 655, 167 P.3d at 792 (Ct. App. 2007). It is not 
the purpose of bail to collect revenue for the state. 8A Am. Jur. 2d 5 2. Additionally, public 
policy disfavors forfeitures. State v. Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho 113, 117-18,952 P.2d 
1249, 1253-54 (Ct. App. 1998); see also People v. liar West Ins. Co., 93 Cal.App.4th 791, 795 
(2001) (the law traditionally disfavors forfeitures and statutes imposing them are to be strictly 
construed). 
Prior to the 2009 amendments, ICR 46(g) provided that: "If the defeiendant appears or is 
brought before the court within one hundred eighty (180) days after the order forfeiting bail, the 
court shall rescind the order of forfeiture and shall exonerate the bond." Prior to the enactment 
of the Bail Act, I.C. 5 19-2927 provided: "if at any time within one hundred eighty (180) days 
after [the court forfeits the bond], the defendant appears and satisfactorily excuses his neglect, the 
court shall direct the forfeiture of the undertaking or the deposit to be exonerated." 
The district court concluded that this statute and rule could be read so as not to be in 
conflict by grafting I.C. 5 19-2927's requirement that the defendant satisfactorily excuse his 
failure to appear into ICR 46(g). However, although the statute and rule can be reasonably 
interpreted so as not to conflict, the district court's interpretation was erroneous. Rather, as 
further evidenced by the subsequent enactment of the Bail Act and the amendments to the rule, 
ICR 46(g) and Section 19-2927 describe alternate methods by which relief from forfeiture can be 
obtained. The policies underlying both bail and forfeiture are met by recognizing that ICR 46(g) 
requires exoneration where the defendant appears in court within 180 days of forfeiture. Finally, 
eve11 if in conflict, bail is a matter of procedure and, thus, ICR 46(g) controls over Section 19- 
2927 to the extent any conflict exists between the two 
Because Mr. Brown appeared before the court within 180 days after the bond was 
forfeited, the district coui-t was required to exonerate the bond. Accordingly, the district court 
erred in dellying Two Jinn's motion to exonerate 
1. Rnle 46(g) and Section 19-2927 describe alternate methods by which relief 
from forfeitnre can be obtained. 
When a statute and rule "can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no conflict between 
them, they should be so interpreted rather than interpreted in a way that results in a conflict." 
State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970,974, 188 P.3d 912,916 (2008). Rule 46(g) and Section 19- 
2927 can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no conflict between them by recognizing that 
they prescribe alternate methods by which relief from forfeiture can be obtained. This 
interpretation is reinforced by the subsequent enactment ofthe Bail Act and amendments to ICR 
46, which indicate that a forfeiture must be exonerated if the defendant appears before the court 
within 180 days of forfeiture or  may be set aside if the defendant appears and satisfactorily 
excuses his neglect. Recognizing that ICR 46(g) and Section 19-2927 provide for alternate forms 
of relief also furthers the policies underlying bail and forfeiture 
a. the Bail Act and the new Rule 46 reinforce that the former Section 19- 
2927 and Rnle 46(g) provide alternate forms of relief. 
Similar to the former I.C. 3 19-2927, the newly enacted I.C. 3 19-2916 provides that "if 
the defendant appears in,court after the entry of the defendailt's failure to appear and 
satisfactorily explains his failure to appear, the court may set aside the order of forfeiture and 
reinstate bail." Like the fonner ICR 46(g), the newly enacted LC. 5 19-2922(5) provides: "the 
court shall order the bail exonerated" when "the defendant has appeared before the court within 
one hundred eighty (180) days of the court's order of forfeiture, u ~ ~ l e s s  the court has set aside the 
order of forfeiture and has reinstated bail pursuant to section 19-2916, Idaho Code." Similarly, 
the new ICR 46(k)(l) provides: "If the defendant appears before the court where the charge is 
pending, within one hundred eighty (180) days after the order forfeiting hail, upon motion of the 
person posting bond, if the court has not set aside the forfeituxe, the court shall rescind the order 
of forfeiture and shall exonerate the bond." 
Thus, the Bail Act provides for relief from forfeiture in circunlstances where the 
defendant satisfactorily excuses his failure to appear or where the defendai~t is brought before the 
court within 180 days. The new statute, like the old rule and statute, provide for alternate 
methods by which relief from forfeiture can be obtained. This coilclusion is reinforced by ICR 
46(h)(3), which is identical to the former ICR 46(e)(5), and provides: "if the defendant does not 
appear or is not brought before the court within one hundred eighty (180) days after the entry of 
the order forfeiting bail, the clerk, upon receiving payment of the forfeited bail, shall remit such 
forfeiture to the county auditor for distribution and apportionment." This rule does not set forth a 
mecha~~ism to remit the forfeiture where a defendant appears within 180 days and the court 
nonetheless refuses to exonerate the bond. 
Rather than recognize that I.C. $ 19-2927 and ICR 46(g) prescribe alternate methods of 
relief, the district coua concluded that the requirement that the failure to appear be satisfactorily 
excused "should be read to apply to the rule." R. 98. However, in drafting the rule, the Court 
was surely aware of the language in LC. 5 19-2927 and, if it indeed intended to graft a 
requirement that the failure to appear be satisfactorily excused, it could have easily included 
express language to that effect. The absence of such la~guage cannot be reasonably coilstrued as 
an intent to include the statutory requirement that a defendant excuse his failure to appear. 
Rule 46(g) cannot be reasonably read to require the defendant to satisfactorily excuse his 
failure to appear and, instead, plainly requires exoneration when the defendant appears before the 
court within 180 days of forfeiture. However, ICR 46(g) call be read so as not to conflict with 
LC. 5 19-2927 by recognizing that the former rule and statute, like the new Bail Act, provide for 
alteinate methods of obtaining relief from forfeiture. 
b. recognizing that I.C. 5 19-2927 and ICR 46(g) prescribe alternate 
methods of the relief furthers the purpose of bail and forfeiture. 
The priinary purpose of bail is to ensure the defendant's appearance in court and not to 
punish the surety. Quick Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho at 655, 167 P.3d at 792. The purpose of 
forfeiture is to create an incentive for sureties to take reasonable steps to supervise and recapture 
fugitive defendants. State v. Ventuva, 952 A.2d 1049, 1054 (N.J 2008). Exoneration as set forth 
in ICR 46(g) furthers the primary purpose of bail because it provides for automatic exoneration 
when the defendant has appeared in court. Rule 46(g) also furthers the pulpose of forfeiture by 
providing an incentive to the bail and the defendant to effectuate the defendant's re-appearance 
following a failure to appear. 
Contrary to the district court's reasoning, the excuse for failure to appear requirement is 
neither reasonable nor appropriate: "to ensure that the defendant has the proper motivation for 
malting a timely appearance" because "if the defendant can automatically get his money back by 
appearing anytime within 180 days, then there is no reason why the defendant should appear on 
time." R. 98. Initially, a defendant has plenty of incentive to appear in court apart from 
forfeiture, not the least of which is preventing a new felony charge of "bail jumping" pursuant to 
I.C. 5 18-7401 or incurring the displeasure of the court that will ultimately sentence him. 
Moreover, the district court's reasoning ignores the nature and prevalence of surety bail 
bonds. In the case of a surety bail agent, the defendant pays a non refundable premium. See I.C. 
5 41-1042 (premiums allowable charge in bail transaction). Thus, the defendant does not "get his 
money back" by appearing in court and, instead, the bail avoids the forfeiture. The primary 
rationale of bail forfeiture is not to provide an incentive for the defendant to appear and, instead, 
is to create an incentive for sureties to take reasonable steps to recapture fugitive defendants. See 
Ventura, 952 A.2d at 1054. Where a defendant who fails to appear is brought before the court, 
the purpose of bail is satisfied. 
That mandatory exoneration pursuant to former ICR 46(g) furthers the purpose of bail is 
reinforced by the Bail Act, which provides for automatic exoneration where the defendant 
appears before the court within 180 days, and was enacted in part to "ensure the appearance of 
defendants before the courts." LC. $5 19-2902(2)(a), 19-2922(5). For instance, here, Mr. Brown 
was retunled to the court and ultimately sentenced for his crime. Thus, the purpose of bail- 
ensuring the defendant appears in court to answer the charges at hand - was ultimately fulfilled. 
To require Two J i m  to pay the forfeiture under such circumstances simply punishes Two Jinn 
and generates revenue for the state. 
Additionally, to satisfy the purpose of both bail and forfeiture, it is important to give the 
bail incentive to ensure that the defendant is returned to the court in one manner or another. 
There are a number of ways a bail agent can effectuate a defendant's re-appearance in addition to 
surrendering the defendant to the county in which the case is pending. For instance, a bail agent 
might begin with calling on relatives and friends (particularly those that posted collateral to 
secure the bail) to pressure the defendant into voluntarily re-appearing. A bail agent might utilize 
investigatory efforts to locate the defendant in another county or state but, based on concerns 
regarding a breach of the peace, may prefer to have law enforcement arrest the defendant. 
Refusing to aclcnowledge automatic exoneration pursuant to ICR 46(g) creates the perverse 
incentive for bail agents to surrender the defendants themselves, even where less intrusive means 
can effectuate the defendant's appearance in court or where law enforcement would be better 
equipped to prevent a breach of the peace. Limiting a bail agent's ability to obtain exoneration to 
circumstances where the defendant provides a satisfactory excuse or the bail agent surrenders the 
defendant to the county where the case is pending would discourage bail agents from effectuating 
the defendant's appearance in coua through other means. 
Finally, to not recognize automatic exoneration pursuant to ICR 46(g) would lead to an 
absurd result. Pursuant to fonner 1.C. S, 19-2925, "the bail, at any time before they are finally 
discharged, and at any place within the state" inay arrest the defendant. If Two Jinn had 
surrendered Mr. Bro~vn to the Ada County Jail within the 180 days, its bond would have been 
exonerated. See I.C. S, 19-2927. Here, Mr. Brown was in the custody of the Ada County Jail 
months before the 180'~ day following forfeiture. R. 79,84, 87 (court minutes noting the 
defendant was in custody). Because Section 19-2925 permits the bail to arrest the defendant at 
"any place in the state," Two Jinn was authorized to arrest Mr. Brown at the Ada County Jail. 
However, assuming the jail would petmit it to do so, it would make no sense to require Two Jinn 
to arrest Mr. Brown while he was already in the Ada County Jail's custody, so that it could in 
turn surrender him thereto in order to get bond exonerated. 
c. conclusion. 
As evidenced by the newly enacted statue which permits a bail agent to obtain 
exoneration where the defendant appears before the court within 180 days or where he 
satisfactorily excuses his failure to appear, fonner I.C. 5 19-2927 and ICR 46(g) also provide 
alternate methods for a bail to be exonerated. Because the rule and statute do notconflict and 
Mr. Brown was brought before the court within 180 days of forfeiture, Two J i m  was entitled to 
exoneration of its bond. This interpretation furthers both the purpose of bail and forfeiture. The 
district court therefore erred in deilyiiig Two Jim's motion to exonerate. 
2. Rule 46(g) prevails over Sec t io~~  19-2927 to the extent any conflict exists. 
"Where conflict exists between statutory criminal provisions and the Idaho Criminal 
Rules in matters of procedure, the rules will prevail." State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 541, 
700 P.2d 942,944 (1985). In Cuvrington, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed "whether the 
granting of bail is a matter of substa~~tive law and therefore within the exclusive province of the 
legislature or whether . . . the question is merely one of procedure and therefore a matter falling 
within the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court." Id. at 540,700 P.2d at 943. "The 
fixing of bail and release from custody are matters traditionally within the discretion of the 
courts." Id. at 541, 700 P.2d at 944. The inherent power to fix bail is grounded in the power to 
hold a defendant. Id. Therefore, bail relates to the maimer of ensuring that the alleged offense 
will be heard by the court and is essentially procedural in nature. Id. 
Additionally, the decision to automatically exonerate a bond when a defendant appears 
within 180 days furthers judicial efficiency and relates to the administration of the courts. A bail 
agent who assists in bringing a defendant before the court, but who did not surrender him to the 
pertinent county jail, could move for exoneration pursuant to ICR 46(e)(4), which permits the 
court to set aside a forfeiture and exonerate bond when justice does not require enforcement of 
the forfeiture. Such fact intensive motions necessarily use the judiciary's resources. Where the 
defendant re-appears in court within 180 days, the purpose of bail and forfeiture has been 
satisfied. Thus, rather than punish the surety through forfeiture or take up the judiciary's 
resources through motions under ICR 46(e)(4), Rule 46(g) relates to the administration of the 
courts by providing for automatic exoneration, which furtllers the interest in judicial efficiency. 
Rule 46, both in its present and former incarnations, sets forth the procedural mechanism 
through which bail is administered, including its modification, revocation, forfeiture, and 
exoneration. Bail and forfeiture ensure the defendant's presence in cou1-1 and thus relate to the 
manner in which the matter will be heard. Accordingly, ICR 46(g) necessarily relates to matters 
of procedure and, as such, if a conflict between ICR 46(g) and LC. $ 19-2927 exists, the rule 
must prevail. 
This interpretation has been formerly adopted by the Fifth Judicial District for the State of 
Idaho through its bail bond guidelines. 111 a section titled "Sources of Law," the guidelines note: 
"In some areas, there exist conflicts between the criminal rules of procedure adopted by the Idaho 
Supreme Court and the statutes adopted by the Legislature. According to State v. Cuvrington, 
108 Idaho 539, if a conflict exists, the rules of procedure prevail." Page 7, Guidelines for the 
Administration of Bail and Bail Bonds in the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Effective September 30, 1997, Updated: November 6, 2007, available online at 
l1ttp://twinfallscounty.org/Bail%20Bond%2OGuidIines%2Oupdate%2ONovO7.pdf The Fifth 
District Guidelines further note a conflict between I.C. $19-2927 and ICR 46(g) and indicate: 
"this again is a coilflict between the rules and the statutes, and as such, ICR 46(g) prevails." Id. 
at p. 38;  see also id. at p. 39. 
Without acknowledging or distinguishing Currington, the district court concluded "the 
statute defines when [the right to relief from forfeiture] exists -when the bondsman brings the 
defendant before the court or when the defendant otherwise appears and satisfactorily excuses his 
neglect. How the court is to determine if the defendant has excused his neglect and how the 
court is to effectuate or actually carry out the exoneration of the bond are procedural issues." R. 
38. The district court's characterization of relief from forfeiture as a "right" does not resolve 
whether ICR 46 and 1.C. 519-2927 deal with matters of substance, rather than procedure. Bail 
can also be characterized as a "right," hut relates to the manner in which an alleged offense will 
be heard and is thus a matter of procedure within the province of the judiciary. See Currington, 
108 Idaho at 541,700 P.2d at 944. Because ICR 46 describes the procedural n~echanisln through 
which bail is administered, modified, revoked, forfeited and exonerated, it relates to the manner 
in which the case will be heard and is a procedural function within the judiciary's authority. 
Relief from forfeiture is intertwined with bail itself and is part and parcel with the maimer 
in which the case will be heard. Accordingly, ICR 46 sets forth procedural rules and to the extent 
those rules conflict with statute, the rules prevails. The district court therefore erred in denying 
Two Jim's motion for exoneration. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion in Denying T w o  Jinn's Motion for 
Reconsideration. 
Two Jim1 filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that it was entitled to exoneration 
pursuai~t o ICR 46(g) because there was no conflict between ICR 46(g) and I.C. 5 19-2927 and 
that forfeiture remedies are procedural in nature. R. 110-12. Two J i m  further noted that, 
contrary to the district court's concern, the state could recoup extradition costs i11 the absence of 
forfeiture.' R. 113. The district court denied Two Jinn's inotion asserting that the 
reconsideration niotion did not provide any information that changed its previous conclusions. 
R. 128. 
A decision to grant a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
Straub v. Sinitlz, 145 Idaho 65, 71, 175 P.3d 754,760 (2007). In reviewing a trial court's exercise 
of discretion, this Court considers whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one 
of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consisteilt with 
applicable legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Rupp, 
123 Idaho 1,3,843 P.2d 151, 153 (1992); QuickRelease Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho at 655, 167 P.3d 
at 792. 
Here, the district court abused its discretion in denying Two Jinn's motion for 
reconsideration because it failed to act consistently with applicable legal standards. As set forth 
above, ICR 46(g) plainly requires exoneration where the defendant is brought before the court 
within 180 days of forfeiture. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the district court erroneously 
interpreted the rule as requiring the defendant to satisfactorily excuse his failure to appear and 
erroneously concluded that the rule dealt with matters of substance instead of procedure. The 
district court relied on its previous reasoning to deny Two Jim's motion for reconsideration and, 
thus, failed to act consistently with applicable legal standards. Accordingly, the district court 
abused its discretion in denying Two Jinn's motion for reconsideration. 
Pursuant to the Bail Act and the revised ICR 46, "where the defendant was not retunled 
by the person posting bail to the sheriff of the couilty where the action is pending, the court may 
condition the exoneration of bail and the setting aside of the forfeiture on payment by the person 
posting bail" of any costs incurred by law enforcement from transporting the defendant to the jail 
of the county where the charges are pending. LC. $ 19-2922; ICR(k). 
V. CONCLUSION 
Two J i m  respectfully asks that this Court vacate the district court's orders denying its 
motion to set aside the forfeiture, and its motion for reconsideratio~l of that order, and enter an 
order exonerating the bond. 
Respectfully submitted this day of July 2009. 
Attorney for Two Jim, Inc. 
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